

A theory is consistent if it does not prove a contradiction.

A theory is complete if every sentence (or its negation) has a proof in that theory.
(i.e. nothing is undecidable)

Earlier: we saw 1st order arithmetic (look at 8 April notes, p.2)

Add one more axiom:

Axiom (10) for any predicate P, the following is an axiom:

$$(P(0) \wedge \forall x (P(x) \rightarrow P(Sx))) \rightarrow \forall y (P(y))$$

↑
"INDUCTION"


We call First Order Arithmetic + Axiom 10

"Peano arithmetic"

↑
complete?

↑
consistent?

Iteration - Fibonacci sequence



$$F_{n+1} = F_n + F_{n-1}$$

$$F_{n+2} = F_n + F_{n+1}$$

} recursive definition
⚡ self-referential

Factorial

$$4! = 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1$$

$$5! = 5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1$$

$$n! = n(n-1)(n-2) \dots (3)(2)(1)$$

$$(n+1)! = (n+1) \underbrace{n(n-1) \dots 2 \cdot 1}_{n!} = (n+1) n!$$

recursive

Ackermann function

$$Ack(x, y) = \begin{cases} y+1, & x=0 \\ Ack(x-1, 1) & y=0 \\ Ack(x-1, Ack(x, y-1)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$Ack(0, 0) = 1$$

$$Ack(0, 1) = 2$$

⋮

$$Ack(0, y) = y + 1$$

$$Ack(1, 0) = Ack(1-1, 0) = Ack(0, 0) = 1$$

$x=1, y=0$

$$Ack(1, 1) = Ack(0, Ack(1, 0))$$

$$= Ack(0, 1) = 2$$

This function gets very large very fast:

$$Ack(4, 3) = 2^{2^{65,536}} - 3$$

A primitive recursive function is a special kind of recursive function. Technical def too complicated for this class.

Fibonacci } primitive recursive
factorial } primitive recursive

Ackermann - not

Theorem: Any primitive recursive function can be expressed in Peano arithmetic.

Gödel numbers: a way to assign numbers to sentences in a theory

<u>Symbols</u>		<u>numbers</u>
0	↔	1
.	↔	2
+	↔	3
=	↔	4
(↔	5
)	↔	6
∧	↔	7
∃	↔	8
x	↔	9
		⋮
		y ↔ 10
		SO ↔ 11
		SSO ↔ 12

$$SO \cdot SO = SO$$

↓ Gödel #

$$2^{11} 3^1 5^2 7^{11} 11^1 13^4 17^{11} 19^1 \leftarrow \underline{\underline{BIG}}$$

iden

encode

abcd as

$$\begin{matrix} \#(a) & \#(b) & \#(c) & \#(d) & \#(e) \\ 2 & 3 & 5 & 7 & 11 \dots \end{matrix}$$

Super Gödel number

assigns a number to a proof

$$2^{g_1} 3^{g_2} \dots \text{ where } g_i \text{ is Gödel number of line } i \text{ in proof}$$

Proof of $SO+SO=SSO$ from 8 April p.3:

$$\forall y (SO+Sy = S(SO+y)) \leftrightarrow 2^7 3^{10} 5^{11} 7^1 11^3 17^{11} 19^{10} 23^{29} 31^1 \dots \text{ etc}$$

$$SO+SO=S(SO+O) \leftrightarrow \# = g_2$$

$$SO+O=SO \leftrightarrow \# = g_3$$

$$SO+SO=SSO \leftrightarrow \# = g_4$$

Super Gödel # of the proof is

this was a proof of $\emptyset \equiv SO+SO=SSO$

$$2^{g_1} 3^{g_2} 5^{g_3} 7^{g_4} \sim \text{incredibly large \#}$$

$\lceil \emptyset \rceil$

$$102$$

$$\wedge$$

$$2 \ 51$$

$$\wedge$$

$$3 \ 17$$

$$51 = 3 \cdot 17$$

$$217$$

$$\frac{217}{3}$$

$$\frac{72}{3}$$

$\text{Prf}(m, n) \sim$ true if m is Super Gödel #
 of a proof of the sentence
 whose Gödel # is n
 false otherwise

Theorem Prf is primitive recursive

If ϕ is a sentence, define $\text{diag}(\phi) = (\exists y)(y = \overset{\text{super Gödel \# of } \phi}{\text{Pr}(\phi)} \wedge \phi)$

Define

$$\text{Gdl}(m, n) := \text{Prf}(m, \text{diag}(m))$$

is true whenever m is Super Gödel # of a proof of the formula $\text{diag}(m)$.

The self-reference: define

$$Uy = (\forall x) \neg \text{Gdl}(x, y)$$

$$\boxed{G = \text{diag}(Uy)} \longleftarrow \text{Gödel sentence}$$

$$G = (\exists y) (y = \ulcorner U_y \urcorner \wedge U_y)$$

$$= \text{There exists } y (y = \ulcorner U_y \urcorner \wedge \forall x \neg \text{Gdl}(x, y))$$

no number x exists
such that x is the
super Gödel # of a proof
of

$$(\exists y) (y = \ulcorner U_y \urcorner \wedge U_y)$$

Self-referential

Essentially: G says

"I am not provable."

if G had a proof



⊥ \Rightarrow G cannot have a proof



G is true

uh oh! \Rightarrow Peano arithmetic is not complete!

"Gödel's incompleteness theorem"